Introduction
The economics of electoral democracy is a subject that has been almost entirely neglected by scholars. Democracy requires elections and running for office necessitates resources. But theorists of democracy have had almost nothing to say about how much money should be spent by candidates, or where that money should come from in order to achieve a political system of equality. There is a gaping void in democratic theory.
It is true that an extensive literature exists that argues the United States' political system is damaged by the role private wealth plays in it. Thus Ian Shapiro writes that deliberation in the United States is impeded by the fact that "powerful players…make it their business to shape the terms of public debate through the financial contributions they make available to politicians and political campaigns."
1 Similarly Robert A. Dahl, writes that "because market capitalism inevitably creates [economic] inequalities, it limits the democratic potential of scholars provides a framework by which to assess how candidacies in a democratic electoral system should be paid for. A theory of fair electoral financing does not exist.
Schumpeter's Model
Part of the problem here resides in the fact that almost all of the theorizing that has been done in the past with regard to democracy has concerned itself with limiting popular political influence, not enhancing it. Dating back to Madison, de Tocqueville, and John Stuart Mill, the concern was that the masses in political ascendancy might use their electoral power to impose destructive policies of economic expropriation. Democracy might become, in Maier's words "a voracious mass confiscatory force" heedless of the economic damage it would inflict. 3 To avoid this, these and other theorists sought to devise rules and institutions that would protect against the threat of unconstrained popular rule. Identifying a mechanism for paying for political participation that would approximate political equality was the last thing on their minds.
In the twentieth century the foremost theorist who sought to make "democracy safe for the world" 4 was the That income has to come from another source than the voters.
In the United States typically the costs of running for office are financed by voluntary political donors.
These are individuals who both can afford to make such contributions and have judged that the benefits they obtain from doing so are at least equal to the gains they could secure by allocating those resource to alternative uses. A more appropriate analogy than Schumpeter's would be that in electoral politics funders are the sovereign consumers, not the voters.
But what are they buying? Barring the case of corruption and outright quid pro quos, contributions to political office-seekers can best be understood as purchasing influence over the legislative process. Donors make contributions if they think two conditions will be satisfied: that the influence they thereby secure will exceed the level they would possess if they did not make donations, and that that increase is sufficiently large for them to forego other uses to which those dollars could be The problem is that with non-rivalous goods there is an incentive for would-be consumers to free-ride: benefit from the product without paying for it. But when that occurs extensively production suffers, unless the government intervenes. If non-rivalous goods are marketed to private consumers, demand in the market occurs only to the extent that people eschew getting something for nothing. Since it is assumed that the numbers of such individuals will be significantly lower than if there was no free-riding, demand as expressed in the market will be at a lower level than if all beneficiaries were paying consumers. The consequence is a less than socially level of the service will be produced.
But insufficient availability is not the only problem that emerges when non-rivalous goods are paid for
privately. In addition they will be distributed in socially undesirable patterns. For purposes of illustration consider what would happen if the defense budget were to paid for from private sources.
If instead of being funded from tax revenues, the defense budget were financed privately it is safe to assume there would be a good deal of free-riding. People will refrain from contributing to the defense budget on the assumption that they will be protected whether or not they do so. But it is also reasonable to assume that at least some private individuals will pass up the opportunity to free ride and make a voluntary contribution to the nation's defense. These consumers however will not be able to confine the affects of defense spending to themselves.
Providing security for one cannot be done without providing at least some security for all.
There are at least two groups who might well forego freeloading and voluntarily contribute to the defense budget. One would be composed of individuals who choose to pay for patriotic reasons. They would do so because they think it is their responsibility and duty as citizens to contribute financially in order to protect the country. For them, it is the right thing to do. While not ruling out the possibility that there might be large numbers of such citizens, it seems unlikely that sufficient funds to achieve effective national security could be raised from this source alone. Free-riding is a powerful disincentive to spending.
In the face of a resulting shortfall, those in charge of the country's defense would have to appeal to a second potential pool of donors. These are people who might be convinced that by contributing to the defense budget they Indeed the wealthiest three percent of the population contributed thirty-five percent of that total. As the authors of the survey put it, "the special inequality associated with monetary contributions affects the poor most strongly, but it also means that most of the middle class is underrepresented as well. 12 Based on their survey data, Francia and associates report that "most donors …are conservative on economic and social-welfare issues. More than the rest of the population, they support cutbacks in social spending, oppose spending to alleviate poverty and oppose a national health insurance system. 13 In fact the gap between funder views and that of the public is wide. In the most recent ANES survey, a representative sample of the population was asked to rank on a 7 point scale whether they thought there should either a cut in government services or an increase. In this way private political fund-raising creates the mechanism by which a common set of views among politicians is achieved, just as Schumpeter hoped would occur. Those office-seekers who do not subscribe to the orthodoxy prescribed by the funders find that they have to scramble to obtain even an inadequate level of financial support. Table 397   Table 2 Percentage of Respondents Who Believe "Government Is Run for a few big interests looking out for themselves? government they elect. There is no evidence of a retreat from the public's belief in self-government. There has however been a dramatic increase in the belief that the politicians the electorate votes for no longer faithfully serve the public's interests.
Since the 1960s there has been little change in the participation of the American people as voters in the political process (Table 1) But whatever the merits of these reforms, they were not sufficient to move the public from the belief that the government is not committed to responding to their interests. The data in Table 2 provide no suggestion of any change after passage of FECA or BCRA. The public's belief that the government caters to the wealthy has remained steadfast.
That alienation persisted because the legislation that was passed failed to address the non-rivalous nature of political influence. Both laws were designed to regulate, not eliminate, private political contributions. After their passage, non-rivalous political influence was still for sale, an influence that was retained by a very small number of donors.
The problem of non-rivalous influence can only be solved by treating political campaigning as a public good.
That would require reform legislation to shift from regulating contributions, as it has in the past, to providing public funding for candidates. With that, there would be a decrease in the sale of non-rivalous influence.
To be consistent with free speech principles, such a public funding system would have to be voluntary. It still would be permissible for a candidate to run for office using private contributions financing. But a generously endowed public funding system would create the opportunity for voters to elect candidates who could legitimately claim financial independence from special interests. Because it creates the opportunity for independence from private donors, public funding possesses the potential to rekindle the electorate's belief that the government can be responsive to the needs of more people than just the elite.
Potential objections to such a system are numerous: it would enhance the role of the very government that the public distrusts; it would be expensive and public funds could be better utilized on other projects; it might not work -rich people will exercise their influence in innovative ways if they are deprived of the opportunity to pay for political campaigns. Though each of these reservations has merit, but each can be effectively countered. Public funding would reduce non-rivalous influence and thereby become a mechanism by which distrust is overcome; there is nothing that is more valuable than the institutions of democracy and so election campaigns can claim a priority status in the allocation of government funds; no system is perfect, the rich will still be powerful, but treating election campaigns as a public good would create a counterweight to elite dominance.
Conclusion
The fact that the economics of democracy has not been a subject of academic discussion has meant that the design flaws in the system of private financing of election campaigns in the United States have not been adequately exposed. Treating election campaigns as a public good represents a means to both explain the sources of the distrust that exist between the people and their government and to provide the perspective from which corrective legislation, expanding the domain of political equality, can be enacted.
